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Summary. The production of legislative acts is affected by multiple sources of latent hetero-
geneity, due to multilevel and multivariate unobserved factors that operate in conjunction with
observed covariates at all the levels of the data hierarchy. We account for these factors by es-
timating a multilevel Poisson regression model for repeated measurements of bivariate counts
of executive and ordinary legislative acts, enacted under multiple Italian governments, nested
within legislatures. The model integrates discrete bivariate random effects at the legislature
level and Markovian sequences of discrete bivariate random effects at the government level.
It can be estimated by a computationally feasible expectation–maximization algorithm. It natu-
rally extends a traditional Poisson regression model to allow for multiple outcomes, longitudinal
dependence and multilevel data hierarchy. The model is exploited to detect multiple cycles of
legislative supply that arise at multiple timescales in a case-study of Italian legislative produc-
tion.
Keywords: Hidden Markov models; Longitudinal data; Multilevel models; Multivariate count
data; Political legislation cycles
1. Introduction
Electoral democracies go through recurrent periods of more and less intense legislative activity,
which are known as political legislation cycles. These cycles have recently been stylized by a
number of studies in economics and public choice: Lagona and Padovano (2008) found evi-
dence of pre-electoral cycles in Italian legislatures; Brechler and Gersl (2014) reached similar
conclusions for the Czech Republic during the post-Communist period; evidence of political
legislation cycles has also been found in France (Padovano and Gavoille, 2013) as well as in the
European Parliament (Kovats, 2009).
In this literature, legislative supply is measured by univariate time series of total counts,
starting at the beginning of a legislature, which are usually obtained by considering all the
laws that have been enacted in each month of the legislature. The political legislation cycle is
then deﬁned as the common pattern that is shared by the legislatures under scrutiny. Under
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this setting, estimating the legislation cycle is a problem of cycle extraction from panels of
repeated counts: a classical problem of longitudinal data analysis. Temporal regularities of
legislative supply can therefore be, at least in principle, efﬁciently detected, provided that the
data correlation structure has been properly accounted for.
In this work, we extend this branch of the literature by looking at the legislation process as a
multivariate process that evolves within a hierarchy of nested timescales. A multivariate view of
the legislation process is needed because the legislative activity includes acts of various types,
depending on the institutional procedures of each country. The heterogeneity of legislative acts
has so far been ignored by the literature, which focuses on univariate trajectories of total leg-
islation, which is often obtained by merging the approval of the various types of legislative
instruments into a single count. This approach is reasonable under the assumption that legis-
lators view different legislative acts as exchangeable tools to enact a given political decision.
As pointed out by recent researches on political legislation theory (Padovano and Petrarca,
2013), legislators do discriminate over time between different legislative tools. A multivariate
approach to legislation data analysis allows an examination of the joint distribution of multiple
trajectories of legislative supply, one for each legislative act, and testing whether the hypothesis
of discriminatory strategies is consistent with the data.
Moreover, during a legislature, many political events inﬂuence the legislation process. These
events segment the legislatures inmultiple periods and generate perturbations that take the form
of small-scale cycles, nested within large-scale cycles that span through an entire legislature.
Empirical evidence of nested legislation cycles has been found in the French system, where
Parliamentary legislatures are interrupted by Presidential elections (Padovano and Gavoille,
2013), as well as in the European Parliamentary system, where legislatures are segmented by
the reallocation of the agenda power (Kovats, 2009). Small-scale cycles seem to arise also in
Italy, where legislative activity is frequently interrupted by government ‘crises’, i.e. changes of
government due to changes in the supportingmajority, without that the legislature is necessarily
dissolved and new elections are called. Because of nested cycles, the trajectories of legislative
activity often take complex shapes of difﬁcult interpretation, which complicate the extraction
of cycles at the legislature level. In this work, we allow for multiple timescales, facilitating the
extractionof large-scale effects net of small-scale perturbations.We further exploit the additional
information provided by the segmentation of a legislature, which would be ignored if a single
timescale was considered.
This novel perspective on the legislative process has been made possible by a recently assem-
bled data set on Italian legislative activity. This study involves 52 bivariate time series of the
monthly counts of two different types of legislative acts, namely executive decrees and ordinary
laws, which have been enacted under the 52 governments that segment the ﬁrst 15 legislatures
of the Italian Republic.
We examine these data by estimating ahierarchical Poisson regressionmodelwith a large-scale
and a small-scale latent component. The large-scale component is speciﬁed by two correlated
linear trends, one for each type of legislative act, with random coefﬁcients that vary across
legislatures. The small-scale component is instead speciﬁed as a Markov process that generates
two correlated sequences of random effects, one for each type of legislative act, during each
government tenure. The model hence integrates time constant correlated random effects and
timevarying correlated randomeffectswithin amultilevel framework,where government tenures
are nested within Parliamentary legislatures.
Multilevel random effects are often used in the analysis of non-normal hierarchical data
(Goldstein, 2003), as they provide a ﬂexible strategy to account for complex correlation struc-
tures in the analysis of longitudinal data; see, for example, Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004),
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Steele (2008) and Muthe´n and Asparouhov (2009). Nevertheless, only few studies have dealt
withmultilevel analysis ofmultivariate responses (Goldstein et al., 2009;Goldstein andKounali,
2009). Correlated random-effects models are the most versatile among those that are consid-
ered in multivariate longitudinal data analysis (Verbeke et al., 2014). Their potential drawback
is the computational burden that is required in the estimation of the parameters, which could be
made prohibitively complex as the number of random effects increases and/or as the time depen-
dence is accounted for. Alternative solutions have been proposed by Altman (2007), Maruotti
and Ryde´n (2009), Bartolucci and Farcomeni (2009), Maruotti (2011) and Maruotti and Rocci
(2012). Severe computational issues may arise in multilevel extensions of correlated random-
effects models that involve time varying random effects, like the model that we introduce for
legislative data. These difﬁculties can be overcome by assuming a discrete distribution with a
ﬁnite number of mass points for the random terms. This involves an additional step in themodel
selection, because the support of these distributions is not known in advance; it must be selected
by evaluating the goodness of ﬁt that different supports obtain. There are, however, several
advantages that compensate such complication. First, the random-effect model reduces to a
ﬁnite mixture model with a computationally tractable likelihood function. Second, the possibly
inappropriate and unveriﬁable parametric assumptions about the distribution of the random
effects are avoided. Third, the outcomes are clustered in a ﬁnite number of latent classes that
can be interpreted as typical regimes of the process under examination.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the speciﬁc features of the
Italian legislative data that motivated the choice of a multilevel approach. The hierarchical
Poisson model is illustrated in Section 3, whereas Section 4 is devoted to computational details
regarding the inferential and themodel selection procedures. The results are discussed in Section
5. Finally, Section 6 sums up the relevant points of discussion which emerged in the analysis.
2. Legislative data
The case-study that is discussed in this paper includes 721 months of legislative activity in Italy,
observed from May 1948, when the Constitution of the Italian Republic was enacted, to May
2008, when the XVth legislature ended. This period involves 52 time series of legislative pro-
duction, which begin with the appointment of a new government and end when the government
resigns. Among these resignations, only 15 took place in correspondence to the end of a legis-
lature and can therefore be considered as ‘natural’ events. The remaining 37 events are due to a
government crisis, which eventually results in the appointment of a new government without the
dissolution of the Parliament. Although the Constitution sets the normal duration of a legisla-
ture in Italy to 5 years, only ﬁve legislatures reached this deadline. The end of the remaining 10
legislatures was decided by the President of the Republic, who dissolved the Parliament before
the natural deadline. Anticipated elections occur in correspondence to serious Parliamentary
crises that make it impossible for the President to appoint a new government with a stable
supporting majority.
We examine the twomost important components of the Italian legislative activity, namely the
number of executive decrees and ordinary laws that have been enacted during eachmonth of the
period under scrutiny. Decrees and laws constitute almost two-thirds of the total legislative acts
in the Italian system. The main difference is that laws require the approval of the majority of
the Parliament to come into effect, whereas decrees are chieﬂy administrative acts that usually
require just the approval of the government and the ratiﬁcation by the President of the Republic.
Fig. 1 shows the distribution of ordinary laws and decrees within each legislature, whereas
Figs 2 and 3 display the resulting bivariate time series, clustered within the 15 legislatures under
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Fig. 1. Distribution of (a) executive decrees and (b) ordinary laws during the 15 legislatures of the Italian
Republic
scrutiny. Figs 1–3 show also the trends estimated by ﬁtting a Poisson regression model with the
time from the beginning of a legislature as a covariate. They portray a complex picture, revealing
some features of the legislation process that have been ignored by the literature so far.
First, there is a general reduction over time in the production of ordinary laws and a general
increase of executive decrees (Fig. 1). This is partly explained by the need for ordinary laws in
the very ﬁrst years of the Italian Republic. In addition, these combined trends can be also a sign
of the progressive deterioration of the Italian political system, which increasingly led legislators
to use an executive decree as the standard tool to supply legislation to special interest groups, i.e.
legislation that is not supported by a large consensus, thus avoiding any Parliamentary debate.
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Fig. 2. Monthly counts of decrees, approved in Italy under 52 governments, during 15 legislatures (the
x -axis indicates the time since the beginning of the legislature; , appointment and resignation of each
government): (a) legislature 1; (b) legislature 2; (c) legislature 3; (d) legislature 4; (e) legislature 5; (f) legislature
6; (g) legislature 7; (h) legislature 8; (i) legislature 9; (j) legislature 10; (k) legislature 11; (l) legislature 12; (m)
legislature 13; (n) legislature 14; (o) legislature 15
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Fig. 3. Monthly counts of laws, approved in Italy under 52 governments, during 15 legislatures (the x -axis
indicates the time since the beginning of the legislature;, appointment and resignation of each government):(a) legislature 1; (b) legislature 2; (c) legislature 3; (d) legislature 4; (e) legislature 5; (f) legislature 6; (g)
legislature 7; (h) legislature 8; (i) legislature 9; (j) legislature 10; (k) legislature 11; (l) legislature 12; (m)
legislature 13; (n) legislature 14; (o) legislature 15
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Second, these trends seem almost reversed at the legislature level. Most legislatures feature an
increasing production of ordinary laws as the time of the next elections approaches. The supply
of decrees, in most cases, either decreases or remains constant over time. This phenomenon is,
in part, consistent with the economic theory of legislation, which assumes opposite cycles of ex-
ecutive and ordinary legislation at the legislature level (Padovano and Petrarca, 2013). Laws are
typically subject to Parliamentary debates and usually concern matters of general interest. De-
crees, in contrast, go through more concealed decision-making processes and usually deal with
more speciﬁc matters. The theory holds that lobbies and voters demand legislation in exchange
for respectively resources and votes. Legislators supply legislation in return for resources from
lobbies and votes from voters. Legislators tend to satisfy lobbies’ interests at the beginning of
the legislature, when re-election concerns are discounted away and resources must be gathered.
Yet, as the end of the legislature approaches, time discounting raises the value of votes relative to
the marginal utility of the already gathered resources and makes it increasingly optimal for leg-
islators to satisfy voters’ demands, by means of broad-based legislation. As a result, the running
of time since the beginning of the legislature progressively encourages the supply of ordinary
laws and, simultaneously, discourages the supply of decrees (Padovano and Petrarca, 2013).
Finally, average legislative activity seems to vary across governments, net of long-term and
legislature-speciﬁc trends. This is due to the political costs that every government must sustain
to implement conversely a given legislative act. These costs vary according to the competence of
the members of the government, and with the size and homogeneity of the supporting majority.
Inexperienced governments may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to get a law approved through a Parliamentary
debate. They therefore prefer decrees as a tool to enact policy decisions. Larger government ma-
jorities ﬁnd it generally easier to pass any type of decision, because of the greater Parliamentary
support that they enjoy. This scale effect should be particularly evident in the case of ordinary
laws, which require a Parliamentary debate.
Furthermore, government coalitions receive support at a price that increases with the degree
of fragmentation of the majority. More fragmented majorities are more likely to dissolve in
Parliament and therefore tend to use decrees more often than their more homogeneous coun-
terparts, and vice versa. We have summarized these conditioning factors by means of three
covariates (Table 1). The majority size MS is the minimum of the percentage of the Parliamen-
tary seats held by each government coalition in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. We
consider both chambers because Italy has a system of perfect bicameralism, where to become a
law each bill needs to be approved in the same reading by the two branches of the Parliament.
The homogeneity index H is the degree of homogeneity of the government coalition, weighted
by the fragmentation of the opposition. This index is given by H =HM.1−HO/, where HM
and HO are the squared relative frequencies of the number of the overall Parliamentary seats
(Chamber of Deputies plus Senate) that are held by the government and the opposition coali-
tion respectively. Finally, the index E proxies the experience matured by the members of the
government; it is computed as the average number of years in which government Ministers have
served as Members of Parliament before.
It should be remarked that all factors introduced so far in the analysis vary across govern-
ments and legislatures. As such they cannot explain the ﬂuctuations of legislative activity that
we observe during the activity of a single government. During each government tenure, the ob-
served time series appear characterized by alternating periods of intense and limited legislative
activity. More interestingly, peaks of ordinary legislation often correspond to periods of mod-
erate production of decrees; vice versa, peaks of numbers of decrees are often combined with a
low supply of ordinary laws. The covariates considered may capture this heterogeneity only par-
tially. Indeed, unobserved time varying factors may generate deviations of the outcomes from
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Table 1. Italian legislative activity: summary statistics of the
outcomes and the covariates
Variable Mean Standard %
deviation
Executive decrees 2.290 2.769
Ordinary laws 16.782 19.163
Coalition homogeneity H 0.271 0.177
Government experience E 3.377 1.043
Majority size MS 0.502 0.210
Summer S 0.165
the speciﬁc trend. According to political legislation theory, these deviations can be explained in
terms of different degrees of visibility of the two types of legislative acts. Laws are more ‘visible’
than decrees because, being subject to Parliamentary debates and concerning (usually) matters
of general interest, they allow voters to become easily informed about them. Decrees, in con-
trast, deal with more speciﬁc matters; as such, their approval is generally known only to a more
restricted set of directly interested agents, typically organized in ‘lobbies’. Unorganized voters
usually become informed about legislators’ activities in the proximity of major political events,
such as forthcoming elections or government crises. In contrast, lobbies, being characterized
by lower information costs, remain always vigilant about politicians’ activities. As a result, the
events that draw voters’ attention generate incentives to discriminate between laws and decrees
and to prefer the former to the latter. This implies that, during a government tenure, the normal
legislative activity can be perturbed by peaks of decrees, followed by periods of more intense
production of ordinary laws.
Finally we also control for summer months, when Parliamentary recess forces the legislative
activity to minimal levels. Accordingly, we have included a dummy variable S in the analysis,
which equals 1 during the months of July and August and 0 otherwise (Table 1).
3. Multilevel model for longitudinal bivariate counts
The data that are considered in this paper are in the form of panels of government activity,
clustered within legislatures. A clear hierarchy can be easily detected in the data structure and
different sources of heterogeneity might arise at different levels of the hierarchy. Indeed, our
data on legislative activity represent a special case of clustered panels, because panels are asso-
ciated with the legislative activity of a speciﬁc government, and governments are sequentially
appointed within a legislature. Hence panels are sequentially ordered within groups. This allows
the deﬁnition of two timescales: one indicating the position of each outcome within the panel;
the other indicating the position of each outcome within the cluster. Under this setting, sources
of heterogeneity can be distinguished according to these two timescales, by decomposing the
ﬂuctuations of the data in small-scale and large-scale components.
More precisely, our data include n bivariate time series, which begin with the appointment of
a new government and end with its resignation. These time series are clustered within L groups,
each associatedwith a legislature. Legislatures are of different sizes and government resignations
are unequally spaced during a legislature. Accordingly, we write nl to indicate the size of the
lth legislature, i.e. the number of governments appointed during this legislature, ΣLl=1 nl = n,
whereas Ti indicates the duration (in months) of the ith government, i= 1, : : : ,nl, l= 1, : : : ,L.
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Under this setting, the data can be arranged as a multilevel array of bivariate outcomes, say
ytil = .y.1/til , y.2/til /, t =1, : : : ,Ti, i=1, : : : ,nl, l=1, : : : ,L,
where y.1/til and y
.2/
til indicate the number of decrees and of ordinary laws respectively, approved
during the tthmonth since the appointment of government i, during legislature l. Time t indicates
the position of the outcome within the time series. Each outcome is further associated with the
time τtil since the beginning of the lth legislature, indicating the position of the outcome within
the legislature.Finally, eachoutcome is equippedwitha rowvectorxTtil of timevarying covariates.
In our analysis, this vector includes the time since the enactment of the Italian Constitution,
the government-speciﬁc values of the indices H , M and E and, ﬁnally, the time varying dummy
variable S.
We assume that, conditionally on covariates, the legislative outcomes are generated by com-
bining a latent small-scale process (at the government level) and a latent large-scale component
(at the legislature level).
The latent small-scale process is speciﬁed by a stochastic process .Ut , t=1, 2, : : :/ with bivari-
ate components, say Ut = .U.1/t ,U.2/t /, and ﬁnite dimensional distributions p.u/. Precisely, we
associate each government i with two correlated sequences of random effects, one for each type
of legislative act, say ui = .u.1/i , u.2/i /, where
u.1/i = .u.1/1i , : : : , u.1/ti , : : : ,u.1/Tii /
(decrees) and
u.2/i = .u.2/1i , : : : , u.2/ti , : : : ,u.2/Tii /
(laws). These time varying random effects are drawn from the Ti-dimensional distributionp.uTi/
of the bivariate process Ut and represent small-scale ﬂuctuations of legislative activity.
The latent large-scale component is instead speciﬁed by two correlated trends, with random
coefﬁcients that vary across legislatures, independently of the small-scale process Ut . Precisely,
we associate each legislature l with two correlated trends, one for each legislative act, say
y.1/τ =v.1/0l +v.1/1l τ ,
y.2/τ =v.2/0l +v.2/1l τ ,
where τ is the time since the beginning of legislature l and the four coefﬁcients vl = .v.1/0l , v.1/1l , v.2/0l ,
v
.2/
1l / are drawn from a four-dimensional distribution p.v/.
In summary, the large-scale component is speciﬁed by an array v = .v1: : : vL/ of L four-
dimensional, legislature-speciﬁc random effects. The small-scale component is speciﬁed by an
array u= .u1: : :un/ of government-speciﬁc trajectories of time varying, bivariate random effects.
We further assume that the responses are conditionally independent given the large-scale and
the small-scale random effects, or, in other words, that the conditional distribution of all the
responses y = .ytil, t = 1, : : : ,Ti, i= 1, : : : ,nl, l= 1, : : : ,L/ is a product of univariate conditional
distributions, say
p.y|v, u/=
2∏
j=1
L∏
l=1
nl∏
i=1
Ti∏
t=1
p.y
.j/
til |v,u/:
In particular, we assume that each univariate conditional distribution depends on the random
effects only through v.j/0l , v
.j/
1l and u
.j/
ti , namely
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p.y
.j/
til |v, u/=p.y.j/til |v.j/0l , v.j/1l ,u.j/ti /:
Under these assumptions, the joint distribution of the observed and the unobserved quantities,
say
p.y, v, u/=
L∏
l=1
p.vl/
nl∏
i=1
p.ui/
Ti∏
t=1
2∏
j=1
p.y
.j/
til |v.j/0l , v.j/1l ,u.j/ti /, .1/
is fully speciﬁed by deﬁning
(a) the univariate conditional distributions of each outcome given covariates and random
effects,
(b) the multivariate distribution of the legislature-speciﬁc random effects and
(c) the multivariate distribution of the government-speciﬁc trajectories of random effects.
We specify the univariate response distributions by augmenting the linear predictor of a
Poisson generalized linearmodelwith the randomeffects introduced above. Precisely, we assume
that the responses y.j/til are drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean λ
.j/
til , linked to ﬁxed and
random effects through the canonical logarithm transformation, namely
p.y
.j/
til |v.j/0l , v.j/1l ,u.j/ti /∼Poi.λ.j/til /,
log.λ.j/til /=xTtilβj +v.j/0l +v.j/1l τtil +u.j/ti
.2/
where βj is a vector of (outcome-speciﬁc) regression coefﬁcients and t =1, : : : ,Ti, i=1, : : : ,nl,
l= 1, : : : ,L, j = 1, 2. The above speciﬁcation is identiﬁable under standard identiﬁability con-
straints, namely v.j/01 =u.j/1i =0, i=1, : : : ,nl, l=1, : : : ,L, j=1, 2.
To specify the distributions of the random terms, we take a non-parametric approach and
assume that the randomeffects are drawn fromdiscrete distributionswith aﬁnite numberofmass
points. At the legislature level, we therefore assume that the random effects vl are independently
drawn for each legislature from a discrete distribution, say
vl ∼pM.v,π/, .3/
where pM.v,π/ depends on a vector of M support points v= .v1: : : vM/ with mass probabilities
π= .π1: : :πM/. Each support point includes four co-ordinates, namely vm = .v.1/0m, v.2/0m, v.1/1m, v.2/1m/,
m= 1, : : : ,M. Under this setting, at the legislature level, each support point is associated with
a latent class that indicates a pair of correlated trends: one for each type of legislative act. At
the government level, we assume that the process .Ut , t1/ is a Markov chain with K bivariate
states u= .u1: : :uK/, uk = .u.1/k ,u.2/k /. Each state of the chain is therefore associated with a pair
of random effects, one for each legislative act, that indicate a speciﬁc latent regime of legislative
activity. Because of the Markov property, the chain distribution is fully known up to an initial
probability distribution δ= .δ1: : : δK/, δk =P.U1 = uk/, and a K ×K matrix Q of transition
probabilities qkh =Pr.Ut =uh|Ut−1 =uk/, t>1,h, k=1, 2, : : : ,K,ΣKh=1qkh =1. Accordingly, for
each government i, we assume that the sequences ui = .uti, t=1, : : : ,Til/ are independently drawn
from a joint discrete distribution, say
ui ∼pK.u,δ,Q/, .4/
where pK.u,δ,Q/ is the joint distribution of .U1: : :Ut : : :UTi/.
This model includes some popular approaches to longitudinal data analysis as particular
cases. For example, when the number of the latent states K is equal to 1, the model reduces to
a (bivariate) latent class growth model (Nagin and Land, 1993), in which bivariate panels are
Modelling Legislative Count Data 715
clustered within M latent classes, each associated with a pair of correlated parametric trends.
On the other side, when the distribution p.v/ concentrates the whole probability mass on the
origin, p.v = 0/= 1, the model reduces to a (bivariate) hidden Markov model (Bartolucci and
Farcomeni, 2009; Bartolucci et al., 2013), in which bivariate panels are segmented by the se-
quences of a Markov chain with K states. As an intermediate case, if p.v/ concentrates the
whole probability mass on the intercept, ΣMm=1p.v
.1/
0m, v
.2/
0m, 0, 0/ = 1, the model reduces to a
(bivariate) mixed hidden Markov model (Maruotti, 2011), where the outcomes in a given panel
are segmented by sequences of K latent states and, simultaneously, share a common intercept,
chosen among the M mass points of distribution p.v/.
4. Likelihood inference
The multilevel Poisson model that was illustrated in Section 3 depends on a vector θ of param-
eters that includes three components:
(a) the ﬁxed effects βj, j=1, 2,
(b) the multivariate support points .v.1/0m, v
.2/
0m, v
.1/
1m, v
.2/
1m/ and the related mass probabilities π
of the random-effects distribution at the legislature level and
(c) the bivariate support points .u.1/k ,u
.2/
k / of the time varying random effects, with the initial
probabilities, collected in δ, and the transition probabilities, collected in Q, of the hidden
chain.
The maximum likelihood estimate of θ is the maximum point of the marginal likelihood func-
tion
L.θ/=
L∏
l=1
∑
v
pM.v;π/
nl∏
i=1
∑
u
pK.u;δ,Q/p.yil|u, v,β/ .5/
obtained by integrating the joint distribution (1) with respect to the random effects, where
p.yil|u, v,β/=
Ti∏
t=1
2∏
j=1
p.y
.j/
til |v.j/0l , v.j/1l ,u.j/ti ,βj/:
Expression (5) can be efﬁciently computed by an extension of the forward recursion, which is
well known in the hidden Markov model literature (Baum et al., 1970).
To maximize the likelihood L.θ/, we implement a version of the expectation–maximization
(EM) algorithm (Baum et al., 1970), which is facilitated by the independence assumption be-
tween the latent states of the Markov chain and the legislature-speciﬁc random effects. The
algorithm is based on a complete-data likelihood function, which is obtained by considering
the logarithm of the joint distribution of both the observed and the unobserved quantities (1).
It can be conveniently written in terms of dummy variables that indicate class membership.
Accordingly, let ηlm denote a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the lth legislature is in latent
group m. Similarly, let ξtik denote a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the ith government is
in latent state k at time t and ζtikk′ = ξt−1,ikξtik′ be a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if there is
a transition from latent state k to latent state k′ at time t. Under this setting, the complete-data
log-likelihood of the model proposed is given by
lc.θ/=
L∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
ηlm log.πm/ .6/
+
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
ξ1ik log.δk/ .7/
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+
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
K∑
k′=1
Ti∑
t=2
ζtikk′ log.qkk′/ .8/
+
L∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
nl∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
ηlmξtik
J∑
j=1
log{p.y.j/til |xtil, vm,uk/}: .9/
The EM algorithm alternates two steps until convergence: ﬁrst, the conditional expected
value of the complete-data log-likelihood is computed (the E-step); then, this expectation is
maximized with respect to θ. The EM algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a local maximum
of the likelihood. To increase the chances of reaching the global maximum, we use a short-run
strategy (which was described in the case of Gaussian mixtures by Biernacki et al. (2003)) and
run the algorithm from various starting values, stopping the algorithmwithout reaching the full
convergence. We then select the output which maximizes the log-likelihood and then use such a
value to initialize longer runs of the EM algorithm. Finally, we use the value of the likelihood at
convergence to perform model selection according to the Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
(Schwarz, 1978).
In the E-step, the conditional expected value of terms (6)–(9) is simply computed by a plug-in
of the expected values of ηlm, ξtik and ζtikk′ given the observed data and the current value of the
parameters. Such quantities can be computed by means of an appropriate forward–backward
recursion adapted from the mixed hidden Markov model literature (Maruotti, 2011). In the M-
step, the conditional expected value of terms (6)–(9) is maximized by separately maximizing its
terms. It is straightforward to verify that explicit solutions are available for the latent parameters.
In particular, at iteration r+1, we have
π.r+1/m =
∑
l=1
E.ηlm|y,θ.r//
L
,
δ
.r+1/
k =
n∑
i=1
E.ξ1ik|y,θ.r//
n
,
q
.r+1/
kk′ =
n∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=2
E.ζtikk′ |y,θ.r//
n∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=2
E.ξt−1,ik|y,θ.r//
:
As for the regression parameters and the latent locations, we can use Newton–Raphson algo-
rithms, similar to that used for standard generalized linearmodels. Formally, the update of these
parameters is obtained by maximizing
L∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
nl∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
E.ηlm|y,θ.r//E.ξtik|y,θ.r//
J∑
j=1
log{p.y.j/til |xtil, vm,uk/}: .10/
The maximization of this expression is not complex. Indeed, formula (10) corresponds to
weighted sums of M × K likelihood equations for standard generalized linear models with
weights given by the posterior probabilities E.ηlm|y,θ.r// and E.ξtik|y,θ.r//. The procedure out-
lined above does not provide standard errors for the estimated parameters.We therefore consider
a parametric bootstrap approach, i.e. we have reﬁtted themodel to 250 bootstrap samples, which
are simulated from the estimated model parameters. Other approaches can be pursued (see for
example Bartolucci and Farcomeni (2014)).
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Table 2. Model selection
Government Time varying Legislature Log- BIC
effect heterogeneity effect likelihood
No No No −6378.74 12859.31
2 classes No No −6052.76 12217.39
3 classes No No −5952.63 12036.87
4 classes No No −5928.68 12008.71
5 classes No No −5917.01 12005.12
No No 2 classes −6208.93 12608.70
No No 3 classes −6128.34 12414.62
No No 4 classes −6056.78 12304.39
2 classes No 2 classes −6103.82 12352.42
2 classes No 3 classes −6060.72 12299.11
2 classes No 4 classes −6044.61 12299.80
3 classes No 2 classes −5991.59 12147.70
3 classes No 3 classes −5939.82 12077.05
3 classes No 4 classes −5865.47 11961.25
4 classes No 2 classes −5941.86 12067.97
4 classes No 3 classes −5855.71 11928.58
4 classes No 4 classes −5769.09 11788.25
5 classes No 2 classes −5868.18 11940.36
5 classes No 3 classes −5843.06 11923.01
5 classes No 4 classes −5750.37 11770.54
2 states Yes No −4929.91 9984.85
3 states Yes No −4235.50 8642.10
4 states Yes No −4061.30 8352.92
5 states Yes No −3915.79 8134.29
6 states Yes No −3894.43 8177.12
2 states Yes 2 classes −4815.38 9788.70
2 states Yes 3 classes −4748.94 9688.72
2 states Yes 4 classes −4727.55 9678.84
3 states Yes 2 classes −4180.16 8564.32
3 states Yes 3 classes −4113.71 8464.32
3 states Yes 4 classes −4078.44 8426.69
4 states Yes 2 classes −3975.86 8214.95
4 states Yes 3 classes −3940.99 8178.11
4 states Yes 4 classes −3921.87 8172.77
5 states Yes 2 classes −3876.26 8088.13
5 states Yes 3 classes −3844.48 8057.48
5 states Yes 4 classes −3837.00 8075.42
6 states Yes 2 classes −3870.19 8161.55
6 states Yes 3 classes −3831.61 8117.28
6 states Yes 4 classes −3707.99 8082.95
5. Results
When dealing with discrete random effects, and latent class models in general, it is crucial to
identify the latent structure that recovers the unobservable data structure in the most accurate
and interpretable way. We use the BIC to select the optimal number of latent government-
speciﬁc states and legislature-speciﬁc groups. Furthermore, the BIC is also used to highlight the
usefulness and appropriateness of the approach proposed, by comparing more parsimonious
multilevel and single-levels models, which ignore selected components of the model proposed.
The results of the model selection procedure are displayed in Table 2. Firstly, we consider a
ﬁxed effects approach, by omitting government- and legislature-speciﬁc random effects, i.e.
assuming independent observations. This leads to a misspeciﬁed model. Simply adding (time
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Table 3. Multilevel model with K D5 and MD3: parameter estimates
Results for Results
decrees for laws
Estimate Standard Estimate Standard
error error
Covariate effects Majority size 0.640 0.148 0.567 0.070
Coalition homogeneity −0:536 0.194 0.583 0.061
Government experience −0:057 0.026 0.124 0.014
Summertime −0:187 0.072 −0:688 0.037
Long-run trend Intercept −0:376 0.197 2.919 0.076
Overall time (month) 0.003 0.000 −0:002 0.000
Legislature level: Intercept class 2 −0:896 0.146 0.476 0.054
latent effects Intercept class 3 0.142 0.107 −0:551 0.057
Slope class 1 0.007 0.003 0.020 0.001
Slope class 2 0.005 0.004 0.017 0.001
Slope class 3 −0:019 0.003 0.030 0.001
Government level: Intercept state 2 −1:592 0.190 −5:021 0.207
latent effects Intercept state 3 0.816 0.103 −3:320 0.134
Intercept state 4 −0:340 0.095 −1:484 0.028
Intercept state 5 0.174 0.089 −0:810 0.022
constant) speciﬁc effects in only one of the hierarchy levels improves the ﬁt considerably, and
the BIC is strongly in favour of a random-effects model speciﬁcation that allows for dependent
observations. Further improvement of the goodness of ﬁt is provided by multilevel models that
integrate random effects at the government and at the legislature level, conﬁrming the presence
of different sources of heterogeneity. Among these, the best results are obtained with the model
proposed, where the random effects at the government level are dependent over time through a
Markov chain.
From this analysis, a multilevel model with K=5 states of time varying government-speciﬁc
effects andM=3 classes of legislature-speciﬁc randomeffects seemsagoodcompromisebetween
goodness of ﬁt and parsimony. This model decomposes the heterogeneity within the legislation
process into four components: ﬁrst, the effects of a set of covariates, predicted by the economic
theory of legislation, that operate at the single government level within each legislature; second,
two long-run trends that span the 15 legislatures, one for each type of legislative instrument;
third, threepairsof legislature-speciﬁc trends,which identify threedifferentpatternsof legislative
activity; fourth, and ﬁnally, government-speciﬁc sequences of random effects, which capture the
residual variability of the supply of legislation during the tenure of each government. Table 3
displays the estimates of these four components.
The covariate effects are consistent with the predictions of the economic theory of legislation,
which was described in Section 2. The size of the Parliamentary majority acts as a scale factor,
since it facilitates, other things being equal, the approval of both types of legislative instrument.
As expected, this effect is muchmore signiﬁcant for ordinary laws, which require the approval of
the Parliament. The homogeneity of the government coalition, instead, has opposite effects on
the supply of decrees and of laws. More homogeneous coalitions tend to pass policies through
ordinary laws, as they are less fearful of an open Parliamentary debate. By the same logic, more
fragmented majorities tend to resort to decrees more. The experience and the competence of
government Ministers present a similar pattern of results; high rates of production of ordinary
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laws are associated with high levels of competence or experience, since more seasonedMinisters
are likely to have more followers in the Parliament; low levels of competence or experience are
instead correlated with high rates of approval of executive legislation. Finally, as expected, the
summermonths cut down the enactment of both decrees and laws; yet, this drop is more evident
for laws than for decrees. This difference is possibly because of the Parliament recess in summer,
whereas ministries remain open during this period. It could also indicate that legislators take
advantage of the fact that during summer months voters’ attention is lowest, which minimizes
the cost of satisfying lobbies’ interests by means of decrees.
The second part of Table 3 illustrates two opposite long-term trends across legislatures: an
upward sloping trend for decrees and a downward sloping trend for ordinary laws. These trends
well represent the progressive deterioration of the Italian political system. As time went by,
Italian legislators increasingly refrained from taking decisions through an open Parliamentary
debate and preferred to adopt them by means of less visible legislative acts, such as decrees.
The third part of Table 3 displays the coefﬁcients of theM =3 trends of legislative activity that
operate at the level of each legislature, withπ= (0.53; 0.20; 0.27). These trends can be interpreted
as components of large-scale variation, net of the long-run trends, of the ﬁxed effects and of
government-speciﬁc small-scale ﬂuctuations. Each trend is associated with a latent class; the
posterior membership probabilities E.ηlm|y,θ.r// can be exploited to allocate each legislature
to a maximum probability class. This allows associating each trend with a homogeneous group
of legislatures. Speciﬁcally, the model allocates legislatures II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX and
XI to group 1, legislatures I, XIV and XV are clustered within group 2, and the remaining
legislatures are assigned to group 3. The distinguishing feature of group 1, the group with the
largest number of legislatures, is an increasing supply of ordinary laws as the months pass and
a steady supply of decrees over time. Group 2 shares similar slopes to those of group 1, but the
intercepts are quantitatively different, as they identify a higher production of laws and a lower
supply of decrees. Group 3, ﬁnally, is instead characterized by opposite cycles of decrees and
laws.
The ﬁnding of three distinct types of legislature clearly shows that the various legislatures
do not have a uniform political legislation cycle, as both the theoretical and the empirical
literatures often maintain. It also points out that the opposite cycles of laws and decrees, which
the economic theory of legislation predicts, take place only under special conditions. Group 3
actually includesmost of the legislatures that reached their natural end of 5 years. However, nine
of the 10 legislatures that endedprematurely donot showopposite cycles of laws anddecrees. The
small number (15) of legislatures in our sample, however, prevents us from ﬁrmly establishing
that the probability of observing opposite legislation cycles increases with the duration of a
legislature. Nonetheless, this result is in line with Lagona and Padovano (2008) who, in a similar
sample, found that the natural end of the legislature is the necessary condition to observe a peak
of production of ordinary laws immediately before the elections.
Apossible interpretationof these results is that political instability, combinedwithuncertainty
about the end of the legislature, keeps voters’ attention alive throughout the entire duration of
the legislature. This in turn discourages legislators from targeting special interests groups by
means of less visible decrees, which therefore appear evenly spread throughout the legislature.
At the same time, this persistent public attention pushes legislators to enact ordinary laws that
cater for broad interests at rates which increase with the probability of an imminent political
crisis.
Finally, the model clusters the monthly ﬂuctuations of legislative activity of each government
withinK=5 latent states. Again, themaximumover k of the posterior probabilities E.ξtik|y,θ.r//
is used to allocate each month to one of these ﬁve states. Each state is associated with a pair
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of intercepts, which reﬂect the deviations of the rates of production of decrees and laws from
the legislature-speciﬁc trends. Table 3 displays these deviations, taking as reference the pair
.−0:376, 2:919/, of the legislature-speciﬁc trends in group 1. The resulting state-speciﬁc inter-
cepts are shown inFig. 4(a). Three typical regimes can be distinguished. State 2 reﬂects low levels
of production of both laws and decrees. An intense supply of executive legislation, combined
with a reduced production of ordinary laws, characterizes state 3. Finally, the remaining three
states (1, 4 and 5) reveal the opposite behaviour, i.e. an above-trend production of laws and a
below-trend production of decrees. The small-scale ﬂuctuations of the legislative activity of the
various governments can be best described as an alternation of regimes of either moderate (state
2) or intense legislative activity (the other states). This is consistent with the patterns that have
already been described in Figs 2 and 3. Moreover, during the periods of intense legislative ac-
tivity, the deviations of decrees and laws are negatively correlated. This suggests that legislators
discriminate between laws and decrees within a timescale that is deﬁned by the life span of a
single government and not only of an entire legislature. The choice of a legislative instrument is
determined by time varying latent factors that operate between the appointment and the resig-
nation of a government, even if these events do not correspond to the beginning or the end of
a legislature. Examples may be a looming government crisis or the approval of the budget bill.
These factors are likely to include political events that occasionally draw the public attention
and create incentives to discriminate between more or less visible legislative tools.
The remaining three panels of Fig. 4 illustrate the timing at which these discriminatory strate-
gies take place. For this, we show the percentages of governments in a given state, computed
every month since the day of their appointment. These trajectories are cut at the 13th month,
which is the median survival time of the governments in the sample. Beyond this point, the small
sample sizes lead to irregular trajectories with misleading shapes. In this computation, we have
also merged the percentages of states 1, 4 and 5, which are associated with similar regimes of
legislative activity. The trajectory of high production of ordinary legislation (states 1, 4 and 5)
increases after the 10th month. This suggests that a looming government crisis draws voters’
attention and anticipates the approval of highly visible legislation. As a government crisis ap-
proaches, however, governments become increasingly unable to supply legislation of any type;
transitions to regimes of modest activity (state 2) appear more often. Conversely, regimes of
high production of executive decrees (state 3) follow a decreasing trajectory. In the ﬁrst months
of activity, when the new executive enjoys a sort of ‘honeymoon’ period, governments tend to
concentrate on satisfying lobbies’ interests through acts with low visibility. After this period,
governments tend to move to the opposite regime characterized by intense ordinary legislation
(states 1, 4 and 5). Overall, this pattern of results shows that small-scale ﬂuctuations of legislative
activity are characterized by opposite cycles of decrees and laws. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the
following initial and transition probabilities of the government level latent Markov chain:
δ=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ1
δ2
δ3
δ4
δ5
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0:04
0:22
0:34
0:28
0:12
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠,
Q=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
q11 q12 q13 q14 q15
q21 q22 q23 q24 q25
q31 q32 q33 q34 q35
q41 q42 q43 q44 q45
q51 q52 q53 q54 q55
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0:18 0:31 0:04 0:12 0:35
0:01 0:50 0:11 0:31 0:07
0:03 0:26 0:16 0:38 0:17
0:06 0:03 0:00 0:42 0:49
0:16 0:02 0:04 0:26 0:52
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠:
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Fig. 4. (a) The five small-scale regimes of legislative activity under a government, and proportions of gov-
ernments in (b) state 2, (c) state 3 and (d) states 1, 4 and 5 during the first 13 months since the appointment
In summary, this analysis sheds new light on the complex nature of the legislation process, by
providing some empirical evidence that the existing literature had not yet detected. First, leg-
islators discriminate between different legislative instruments over time. Univariate analyses of
total legislation are misleading. Second, temporal regularities of multivariate legislative activity
emerge net of the effects of the size and homogeneity of the majority and of the competence of
the government. These regularities appear consistent with the economic theory of legislation.
Third, latent factors affect the legislative process at multiple timescales, with effects of govern-
ment behaviour nested within large-scale effects that characterize the legislature. Additionally,
the model detects two long-term trends that are speciﬁc to each legislative instrument that en-
dure across legislatures. Complex trajectories of legislative activity can hence be explained only
through the combination of multiple components that act at different timescales.
6. Discussion
Combining different sources of latent heterogeneity is a popular strategy to model complex
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correlation structures. This approach is particularly convenient when multiple components of
heterogeneity are suggested by the structure of the data. In legislation studies, for example, the
data often take the form of panels clustered within groups. Latent heterogeneity can then be
modelled by combining two components that respectively reﬂect the variation between panels
and the variation within panels.
We consider a case-study of legislation where non-normal outcomes are bivariate, panels are
temporally ordered within groups and the interest lies in the estimation of large-scale trajecto-
ries of legislative activity that arise at the group level, net of small-scale patterns within each
panel. Taking advantage of the data structure, we propose a novel multilevel Poissonmodel that
integrates a latent growth model for bivariate trajectories and a latent Markov chain for bivari-
ate small-scale patterns. From a methodological viewpoint, the model proposed extends that
proposed by Bartolucci and Farcomeni (2009), who introduced a time varying latent structure
for longitudinal data (without a multilevel structure). In particular, our proposal ﬂexibly ac-
commodates temporal correlation within panels, heterogeneity between clusters of panels and
cross-correlations between two non-normal outcomes. Despite this complexity, the model is
easy to interpret, as it combines models that are broadly exploited in longitudinal data analysis.
It is also relatively easy to estimate, since it is based on discrete distributions of random effects
that feature a computationally tractable likelihood function.
Taking a multilevel–multivariate approach to legislation data analysis provides some empiri-
cal evidence that the existing literature has not detected so far. Temporal regularities of legislative
supply emerge net of the effects of the size and homogeneity of the majority and of the com-
petence of the government. These regularities appear as a result of the time varying strategic
interactions between legislators, lobbies and unorganized voters. Distinct patterns of legislative
activity occur in combination with the relevant political events that segment the activity of a
political system. We provided such evidence by examining the Italian case. Further research is
needed to compare these ﬁndings with those that may emerge from data about other Western
democracies.
A major issue in the approach considered is related to model selection. In the current paper
we consider the BIC to select the best model. Nevertheless, as is clear from the results discussed,
the BIC tends to overestimate the order of the model, which is deﬁned as the number of distinct
latent classes at the different levels of the hierarchy. Indeed, three out of ﬁve identiﬁed latent
states at the government level capture similar behaviours and twoout of three latent classes at the
legislature level identify similar trends. This is because the BIC selects the latent structure that is
needed to provide a good approximation to the probability distribution, rather than the number
of homogeneous behaviours as such. This is a well-known problem in multivariate clustering
(see for example Baudry et al. (2010)) and further research is needed onmodel selectionmethods
in a multivariate–multilevel context.
We assumed that the random effects at different levels are generated by independent processes.
This assumption leads to a parsimonious multilevel model. An interesting extension would be
to avoid such a restriction as for example in Altman (2007). Nevertheless, including random
effects simultaneously in the observed and latent processes may lead to ﬂat likelihoods, and
convergence may be difﬁcult to achieve. In addition, although appealing, this speciﬁc extension
may not be necessary when the sample size is limited (as in our empirical application).
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